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ABSTRACT 
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The fact of plurality of social cultures is a central topic of interest and debate for political 
theorists. Multiculturalists emphasize the value and significance of social cultures over 
individual liberty. This thesis examines whether cultural rights create an undue privileged 
position for minorities or whether it fosters equality in liberal states. By acknowledging 
the value of culture for individuals, this thesis proposes that cultural rights which endow 
minorities with a special position should not be implemented for the sake of liberal 
neutrality. As a point of illustration, a neutral liberal state, which I call Hazalistan, is 
presented in this thesis. Hazalistan is grounded on the principles of equality, freedom, 
security and diversity. To provide a deeper understanding of these notions, it adduces 
examples on the regulation of religious rights. Although Hazalistan is an imaginary state, 
it is not impossible to find relevant real life examples such as Mauritius, which is a liberal 
state with a multicultural society. 
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ÖZET 
AYRICALIK YA DA EŞİTLİK:  
ÇOKKÜLTÜRLÜLÜK-LİBERALİZM ÇATIŞMASI ÜZERİNE BİR TARTIŞMA 
 
HAZAL TIKIR 
 
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ağustos2016 
 
Tez danışmanı: Yard. Doç. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çok kültürlülük, Liberalizm, Kültür, Din, Haklar, Siyaset Teorisi 
 
Çok kültürlülük siyaset bilimciler için önemli bir ilgi ve tartışma konusudur. Çok 
kültürlülüğü savunanlar bireysel özgürlüklerden ziyade, kültürlerin önemi ve değerine 
vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu tez, liberal toplumlarda azınlıklara kültürel hakların verilmesinin 
ayrıcalık mı yoksa eşitlik mi yarattığını analiz etmektedir. Kültürün bireyler için 
öneminin farkında olarak, bu tezde liberal tarafsızlığı sağlamak adına azınlıklara özel 
konum veren hakların uygulanmaması gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, 
Hazalistan olarak adlandırılan tarafsız liberal devlet örneği öne sürülmektedir. Hazalistan 
eşitlik, özgürlük, güvenlik ve çeşitlilik ilkelerine dayanmaktadır. Konuyu daha 
derinlemesine tartışabilmek adına dini hakların düzenlenmesine dair örnekler 
sunulmuştur. Hazalistan her ne kadar hayali bir devlet olarak sunulsa da gerçek hayatta 
bu tarz devletlerin örneklerini bulmak mümkündür. Bu bağlamda, bu tez çok kültürlü 
liberal bir devlet olan Mauritius’u Hazalistan’ın bir illüstrasyonu olarak sunmaktadır.  
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1.! INTRODUCTION 
  
When we talk about culture, we often make reference to cuisines, daily 
habits, life styles, clothes, social events, festivals, music, literature, art, architecture, 
education, political regimes and religion. And cultural groups are constructed with 
respect to the different norms that they adopt. With the rise of globalization, cultures 
have become flexible and multicultural societies including two or more cultural 
groups have emerged in the modern era.1 In addition to the group cultures, with the 
rise of individualism in modern societies, individualized cultures came into the 
picture. Sheilaism, which is a custom made belief system of Shelia Larson, is one 
of the examples of the individualization of the culture/faith. 2  Regarding these 
notions, individualized or not, culture can be defined as the ideas, customs and social 
behavior of individuals and/or groups. Therefore, culture is a phenomenon that 
permeates large areas of social life.  
 
Culture is also a political matter and is scrutinized by political scientists and 
political theorists. According to multiculturalists, culture is the key in identity 
shaping and political decision making; therefore, culture should be recognized and 
protected in the political sphere. Liberals, in contrast, argue that recognition of 
culture in the political sphere unbalances the equilibrium among individuals. This 
thesis proposes that these demands contradict with the norms of the liberal state and 
therefore such demands must be accommodated with caution and within certain 
bounds. And these bounds do not include the protection of cultures. Erich Fried’s 
famous phrase which is written on Berlin Wall - East Side Gallery also demonstrates 
the dispensability of the protection of the cultures: “Wer will dass die welt so bleibt 
########################################################
1 Although there are pre-modern examples of multicultural societies such as the case of 
the Ottoman Empire, it is hard to compare the pre-modern and modern experiences since 
pre-modern multicultural social structures occurred as a result of invasions. 
2 Jose Casanova, “Private and Public Religions,” Social Research 59, no.1 (1992): 28. 
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wie sie ist der will nicht dass sie bleibt” (He who wants the world to remain as it is 
does not want it to remain). In other words, culture conservation attempts only 
hinder the progress of the cultures. Thus, protecting cultural values without 
questioning them, or interrupting the process of change does not bring any good to 
a society or to cultures.  
 
Although the claims of this thesis do not value, recognize and protect 
cultures (whether or not they are majority and minority cultures), the aim is not to 
despise or eliminate diversity. On the contrary, diversity is encouraged within the 
limits of liberal values. Each person should have a right to exercise his/her own 
culture as long as it does not threaten other people’s security and freedoms. Instead 
of protecting the cultures, liberal state has an obligation to protect individuals who 
are the bearers of the cultures. Correspondingly, liberal values are considered 
superior to cultural values in furtherance of security and harmony of the society.  
 
The reason why liberal norms are essential for peace and social harmony 
becomes evident when cultural norms and liberal norms collide. Rushdie affair is a 
representative case to clarify this matter. Soon after the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Versus, several groups of British Muslims started 
campaigns to publicly condemn the book on the ground that it contains lies about 
Islam and dishonors the religion.3 Afterwards, Supreme leader of Iran, Khomeini, 
also pronounced a dead penalty for Rushdie. Iranian fatwa requiring assassination 
of Salman Rushdie and, in response to such “culturalist” threats, liberal principles 
that guarantee the protection of life and freedom of expression collide in this 
incident. While the former view would reward the killer of Rushdie, the latter view 
calls for preventing all assassination attempts and would punish the killer and treat 
him/her as a murderer.4 Considering this incident, or the cases such as cannibalism, 
the question is “Should we still value and respect cultures invariably despite their 
hazardous potential?” Equal recognition and respect for cultures require equal 
treatment for each culture, are we ready to provide such concessions?  
########################################################
3#Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 299.#
4 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 279-280. 
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Despite the drawbacks of cultural values, there are also advantages of the 
cultures. Since cultures function as a glue among people, feelings and thoughts are 
shaped by the cultures to which people are exposed. In other words, people are 
linked with their cultures through their history, emotions and daily habits. For my 
part, culture should be examined in that it is valuable for the individuals who 
compose the society and contribute the political processes. Culture is an important 
phenomenon not because of its content or historical value, but because of its 
“impacts on people”. As Johnson states “Indeed, we do not directly respect culture 
or particular practices at all. We instead respect the social and political actors who 
endorse cultural practices.”5 In this respect, cultural demands should be taken into 
consideration and culture should be seen as a right for individuals to exercise. Thus, 
my aim is to provide a basis for individuals to exercise their culture in a statuary 
framework. 
 
The issue of culture revives as a response to increasing numbers of 
multicultural states. The topicality of the issue increases the significance of the 
debate between multiculturalism and liberalism. And most importantly, the 
antipodes within the concept of culture is worth to review. Hence, it is important to 
examine whether bestowing cultural rights ensures equality among citizens or 
provides privileges for some cultural groups. In order to provide a background for 
the discussion, the first section elaborates on the multiculturalism – liberalism 
debate with reference to liberal, multiculturalist and liberal-multiculturalist views 
by using a comparative approach. The following section demonstrates an ideal 
neutral state from my point of view. However, it should be noted that the liberal 
norms that are taken into consideration are adopted from European liberalism. 
Accordingly, freedom, harm principle and social harmony, which are the underlying 
concepts of the neutral state, are examined in detail. Cultural rights are discussed in 
two categories, that is, individual-group rights and temporary-permanent rights. In 
the last part of this section, the focus is on the case of religion, which is examined 
by providing case studies from Europe. The third section addresses the minimal 
########################################################
5 James Johnson, “Why Respect Culture?,” American Journal of Political Science 44, 
no.3 (2000): 415.#
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version of the neutral state with reference to the small island state, Mauritius. 
Although Mauritius is not a European country, the liberal norms that they have 
embraced are stemming from European liberalism. Therefore, Mauritius stands as 
an example for the European states to show how to regulate a multicultural society 
with the adoption of European liberal norms. Finally, the thesis ends with a 
conclusion summarizing equal freedoms, security and social harmony which are the 
core concepts of what I take to be the ideal liberal state, which I call Hazalistan. An 
answer to the research question is laid down by referring to what has been discussed 
and argued throughout the thesis. 
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2.! THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Liberalism vs Multiculturalism: A Dilemma? 
 
Classical or early forms of liberalism were found in order to provide a right 
to life, liberty and property. As in Locke’s view, life should be protected, slavery 
should be abolished and property rights should be established. 6  Consequently, 
protection of the liberties is one of the main concern of liberalism. By protecting 
liberties, classical liberals advocate equality and justice in the society. However, 
multiculturalists, who appreciate the value of the plurality of cultures in a society, 
argue that liberalism is unable to uphold its promises.7 Since liberalism has a large 
spectrum of different approaches, the disagreement between multiculturalist and 
liberal camps is stemming from the vagueness of the concept of liberalism.  
 
William Galston argues that liberal philosophical tradition lodges two 
different camps leaning on different historical processes. While some interpretations 
of liberalism stress the importance of autonomy, other interpretations emphasize 
diversity. Autonomy is linked with the self direction depending on one’s rationality. 
The latter respects and fosters diversified opinions between different groups and 
individuals. However, while some liberals consider both autonomy and diversity as 
the essential components of liberal thought, some liberals consider these two values 
as rivals.8 According to Galston, the reason behind this disagreement is historical: 
liberal autonomy is the product of Enlightenment which considers reason “as the 
prime source of authority”; however, liberal diversity arose with the Protestant 
########################################################
6 John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” in Modern Political Thought: 
Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2008), 292-293. 
7 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 14.#
8 William A. Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105, no.3 (1995): 521. 
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Reformation as a solution for the dispute between politics and Christendom. 9 
Conversely, Kukathas thinks that diversity and autonomy are not rivals, liberalism 
does not intervene in people’s lives and therefore Kukathas states that  
“The reason why liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism 
is that liberalism is itself, fundamentally, a theory of multiculturalism. This 
is because liberalism is essentially a theory about pluralism; and 
multiculturalism is, in the end, a species of pluralism.”10  
 
In essence, Kukathas does not offer any solution for the multiculturalism-liberalism 
conflict. He merely reiterates the general liberal condition that there is no conflict 
to reconcile with. However, his explanation of this non existing conflict does not 
seem satisfactory. Accordingly, if liberalism does not foster diversity, then there is 
no dilemma between multiculturalism and liberalism since they became rivals 
eminently. Therefore, the focus will be on the pluralist liberal views to demonstrate 
the dilemma.  
 
Before demonstrating the dilemma between the pluralist liberal view and 
multiculturalist view, the notion of pluralism should be clearly defined in order to 
eliminate the semantic shift. Here, Joppke’s definition of pluralism could serve as a 
starting point; he writes, “Pluralism requires voluntary group memberships, multiple 
affiliations in the context of cross-cutting cleavages, and ‘a reciprocal recognition’ 
between conflicting parties.”11 But the question that arises here is this: if pluralism 
is already accepted by liberals, why is there a conflict between liberal and 
multicultural groups? Either liberals do not apply pluralism in the right sense, or 
multiculturalist expectations do not match with pluralistic claims.  
 
The claim of multiculturalists is that liberalism considers all the 
citizens/people equal by closing its eyes to the differences. Multiculturalists defend 
their position by stating that difference blind equality does not bring cultural 
equality to citizens rather, it promotes the majority culture and absorb the minority 
########################################################
9 Ibid., 525. 
10 Chandran Kukathas, “Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference,” 
Political Theory 26, no. 5 (1998): 690.#
11 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and 
Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 238.  
7#
#
culture.12 Considering each person’s identity as unique, multiculturalists emphasize 
the identity politics, which is based on the assumption that each identity should be 
recognized. Margalit and Halbertal as multiculturalists, thus, advocate that culture 
is an important factor in the formation of social identities and therefore, it should be 
considered as an item in politics. Moreover, they assert that “Culture plays a crucial 
role in shaping the personalities of individuals, especially in those aspects that they 
and their environment consider central for constituting their personal identity.”13 In 
a similar vein, Taylor upholds that recognition of individual or group identity with 
respect to their distinctness from other individuals or groups is essential. The 
distinctness among people makes them unique and glossing over these differences 
exalts the majority culture and identity.14 Correspondingly, the influence of cultures 
on identities cannot be denied. Identity and culture are interrelated phenomena since 
they affect our choices and behaviors. Our behaviors and decisions stem from the 
choice sets that our cultures propose and they also affect our social life and 
interaction with others. Therefore, also in the political sphere, our identities become 
the indicators of our future decisions. 
 
To put it briefly, multiculturalists argue that the dominance of majority 
culture leads to assimilation of minority cultures and loss of diversity in the society. 
Although multiculturalists impose a duty on the state, this duty involves protection 
of cultural identities and assurance of the survival of the cultures. In contrast to the 
multiculturalist view, liberals do not impose such duty on state. Besides, cultures 
are also open to change and by recognizing the historical variability of cultures, 
cultures cannot be described as stable and fixed phenomena. As Alan Patten states 
“There is no reason to think, then, that the idea of cultural preservation is committed 
to the freezing of cultures in any special form or to the reification of particular ideas 
or traditions as somehow definitive of culture.”15 With reference to this conflict, 
########################################################
12 Nancy Fraser “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post 
Socialist’ Age,” in Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to Current Debate, ed. 
Cynthia Willett (Massaschusetts/Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998), 23. 
13 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social 
Research 71, no.3 (2004): 539.#
14 Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 38.   
15 Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: Moral Foundations of Minority Rights 
(Princeton&Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 50.#
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Habermas maintains that liberalism establishes a state which is blind to differences 
such as skin color and grants equal rights and chances for their life prospects. 
Moreover, he deduces that liberalism allocates an equal amount of freedom for all 
cultures and groups.16 To clarify, liberal state is insensitive to ethnic and cultural 
differences for the sake of neutrality. Although liberal state does not assume that it 
has responsibility for the protection of cultures and identities, the amount of freedom 
and rights that is allocated is equal. 
 
Another issue between multiculturalists and liberals is about freedom of 
expression. Multiculturalists argue that exercise of the culture is linked with 
freedom of expression and therefore, the right to culture should be provided by the 
liberal state. Accordingly, Margalit and Halbertal state that  
“The right to culture is not, in our opinion, a special case of the right to 
freedom of expression in the liberal society. On the contrary, freedom of 
expression is a special case whose principal justification is the right to 
culture.”17  
 
Although Margalit and Halbertal’s objection on that matter seems coherent, the 
boundaries of freedom of expression apply to the right to culture as well. However, 
liberals argue that freedom of expression is, indeed, a negative liberty whose 
boundaries are drawn by state and it does not assure infinite liberty for the citizens. 
Limiting cultural practices does not aim to eliminate differences. Indeed, it helps 
people to exercise their freedom equally. In other words, the boundaries of freedom 
of expression does not aim to create a single type of culture.  
 
In addition, liberalism does not necessarily promote every form of diversity. 
By emphasizing the limitations of liberalism, Crowder argues “…pluralist liberals 
cannot and need not promote, in the name of diversity, practices that are the 
destructive of diversity.”18 Without any form of diversity, liberal state may find 
itself in danger. However, without core liberal values, security, equality and 
########################################################
16 Jürgen Habermas, “Multiculturalism and the Liberal State,” Stanford Law Review 47, 
no. 5 (1995): 849-850.#
17 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social 
Research 71, no.3 (2004): 540. 
18 George Crowder, “From Value Pluralism to Liberalism,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 1, no.3 (1998): 9.##
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freedom, liberal state cannot be established in the first place. To sum up, liberalism 
fosters social bonding, innovation and interaction through socialization without the 
intention of assimilation but with respect to liberal values. As Tseung-Wong and 
Verkuyten state “Social cohesion does not have to equate to uniformity or 
assimilation when the identity of the nation is about diversity.”19 Relatedly, liberals 
argue that liberalism is difference blind only in the sense of negative liberties. As 
Barry states that “The liberal notion of equality before the law, so far from resting 
on the assumption that differences do not exist, is proposed as the fairest way 
accommodating them.” 20  Therefore, blaming liberalism as assimilationist is a 
misinterpretation of the liberal objectives. 
 
However, the liberal diversity, which is restrained by the liberal values, is 
not sufficient to fulfill multiculturalist demands. As Levy classifies in detail, 
multiculturalists demand in compliance with diversity as follows, “Cultural rights-
claims and special policies for accommodating ethnic and linguistic pluralism 
include exemptions, assistance, self-government, external rules, internal rules, 
recognition/enforcement, representation, and symbolic claims.” 21  However, all 
these cultural right claims begin with the issue of recognition. Without the 
recognition of the cultural groups, the rights cannot be bestowed to minority groups. 
Taylor describes recognition as a substantial component of our identity and 
accordingly claims that misrecognition or non-recognition harm people by 
diminishing the self-respect and dignity.22 In the same vein, multiculturalists claim 
that despite already designated rights such as civil rights, there is still room for 
improvement for equal recognition. However, as Raz explains, recognition of the 
groups is contradictive in three ways. First, giving too much power to culture may 
restrict individual freedoms and because of the power of the communities, they may 
act against their will. Second, the liberal values vis-a-vis traditional cultural values 
########################################################
19 Caroline Ng Tseung-Wong and Maykel Verkuyten, “Multiculturalism, Mauritian 
Style: Cultural Diversity, Belonging, and a Secular State,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 59, no.6 (2015): 685. 
20 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 68.  
21 Jacob T. Levy, “Classifying Cultural Rights,” in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian 
Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York/London: New York University Press, 1997), 24. 
22#Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25. 
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may seem superior and worthier. Third, there is a doubt that minority cultures will 
ruin the harmony of the society.23  
 
To clarify, the first concern is related with the right claim controversy and it 
is a huge debate between liberal and multiculturalist camps. Multiculturalists 
constantly state that group is the key characteristic of culture and emphasize the 
affiliation between cultural rights and group rights. In the same vein, Margalit and 
Halbertal describe cultural rights as group rights since the right to culture is 
affiliated with the freedom to choose a way of life which is assigned to a group 
rather than to individuals separately.24 Furthermore, with the recognition of cultural 
groups, cultural groups can be respondents, right claimers and right bearers. As a 
response, liberals assert that liberalism by definition promotes individuality but it 
does not restrict any form of group project that does not contain physical harm. 
Accordingly, each individual has the right to object and make demands for his/her 
beliefs and culture to be taken into consideration. Since individuals are considered 
as only respondents in liberal societies, right claims are actions that can be practiced 
only by individuals. In this respect, liberals ask, why does one need a group to 
demand equal rights? 
 
The second concern emphasizes the importance of liberal values for the 
protection of life, liberty and properties. By allying with communitarians, Habermas 
criticizes the liberal premise that human rights should be protected and privileged 
vis-a-vis popular sovereignty. Habermas argues that human rights should not be 
applied as an external constraint by denying the importance of popular 
sovereignty.25 It is true that the liberal view prioritizes human rights over cultural 
values, however, rather than underestimating popular sovereignty, liberal view 
underestimates minority claims when they contradict with liberal values. Moreover, 
liberal views claim that just society would not constrain the ability of citizens to 
their particular ends; rather it would give them freedom to seek and achieve their 
########################################################
23 Joseph Raz, “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,” (paper presented at the 
conference on Multiculturalism and the Law, Leiden, October, 1992), 174-175.##
24 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social 
Research 71 no.3 (2004): 537.  
25#Jürgen Habermas, “Multiculturalism and the Liberal State,” Stanford Law Review 47, 
no.5 (1995): 852.#
11#
#
ends. Therefore, citizens are free to choose what is good according to their 
perception of the good life. Sandel explicates that rights overrides the conception of 
the good life; therefore, protection of the individual rights is prioritized over cultural 
demands in the liberal view. Accordingly, Sandel writes,  
“The priority of the rights means first, that individual rights cannot be 
sacrificed for the sake of the general good (in this it opposes utilitarianism), 
and second, that the principles of justice that specify these rights cannot be 
premised on any particular vision of the good life.”26  
 
In other words, liberalism provides opportunity to its citizens to perform their 
cultures within the limits of liberal values. Since, not all cultural rights-claims match 
with liberal norms, liberals do not accept reciprocal recognition or self government 
blindly. 
 
Finally, the last concern is about integrity, social sphere and cohabitation 
which constitute the main elements of state sustainability. For the integrity and 
cohabitation, equal citizenship and, therefore, equal rights are preconditions. 
Relating to equality principle, multiculturalists assume that cultural groups should 
be recognized for the sake of equality; however, in order to bestow equal rights for 
everyone, states should either give equal value to all cultures or they should not 
value the cultures at all. Yet, as Jones indicates, the controversial part of recognition 
demands is that people should give equal value to all cultures rather than prioritizing 
their own cultures. He asks “How can we expect people to embrace that 
absurdity?”27 Slave, sexist, theocratic or cannibal cultures exist. Are we ready to 
give equal value to all cultures? Even if states try to implement this policy, would 
citizens approve this? Because of the major controversies between multiculturalist 
and liberal camps, finding a midway is compelling. Herein, the question is “Is it 
possible to have a reconciliation between liberalism and multiculturalism in terms 
of equal rights, freedom and diversity?”  
 
 
 
########################################################
26#Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” Political 
Theory 12, no.1 (1984): 82.#
27#Peter Jones, “Political Theory and Cultural Diversity,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 1, no.1 (1998): 45.#
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2.2. Liberal Multiculturalism 
 
Liberal multiculturalist view is constructed as a way of reconciling between 
liberal and multicultural views. Kymlicka thinks that liberalism and 
multiculturalism can meet on a common ground and cooperate. In other words, 
Kymlicka does not consider multiculturalism as a threat to liberalism and he offers 
“liberal multicultural hypothesis” by claiming that giving special rights to minorities 
would not shatter the core liberal values of democracies. Instead, he argues that 
giving special rights to minorities in order to protect their culture would help to 
secure the justice.28 Moreover, Kymlicka asserts that multicultural hypothesis helps 
to ensure the protection of “values of freedom, equality and solidarity” instead of 
jeopardizing them. For Kymlicka the multicultural policies do not contravene the 
liberal values; on the contrary, multicultural policies enhance the integrity of liberal 
values.29 In my opinion, this statement is flawed. Multicultural policies strengthen 
the liberal values only if they are by nature liberal. Since multicultural policies and 
demands may contain illiberal means and objectives, they can be rejected by the 
liberal state. As Raz writes, “Some cultures repress groups of either their own 
members or of outsiders. Slave cultures, racially discriminatory cultures, and 
homophobic cultures are obvious examples.”30  
 
In a similar vein, Galston introduces “Diversity State – that is, in public 
principles, institutions, and practices that afford maximum feasible space for the 
enactment of individual and group differences, constrained only by the requirements 
of liberal social unity.”31 The requirements that Galston mentions are protection of 
life, protection of basic capacities in terms of maturation, growth and development 
and promotion of social rationality that allows citizens to participate in economy, 
########################################################
28#Will Kymlicka, “Testing the Liberal Multicultural Hypothesis: Normative Theories 
and Social Science Evidence,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no.2 (2010): 
258. 
29#Ibid., 258-264.#
30#Joseph Raz, “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,” (paper presented at the 
conference on Multiculturalism and the Law, Leiden, October, 1992), 184.#
31#William A. Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics 105, no.3 (1995): 524.#
13#
#
society and polity.32 “Diversity State” restricts majority culture’s domination and 
tolerance based relations, and endorses cultural diversity, civic education, 
opportunity to enter and exit groups at one’s own discretion, preservation of the 
principles and institutions that embodies shared citizenship values.33 
 
Loobuyck also upholds the extended meaning of liberalism and states that 
“Liberalism is indeed the response of the modern world to the fact of moral, 
religious, and cultural diversity. Liberalism says that, within some margins, 
differences should be tolerated and accommodated.”34 However, he also adds that 
there are different interpretations of liberalism and some of these are not applicable 
to multiculturalism. Therefore, Loobuyck offers a multicultural liberalism with the 
motto of “pluralism where possible and neutrality when necessary” to reconcile the 
debate between multiculturalism and liberalism.35  And Loobuyck suggests that 
rather than giving minority rights, “multicultural measures”, which are temporary 
and exceptional measures aiming to create equal opportunity and decrease the 
inequalities, should be implemented.36 Loobuyck’s account compared to Galston 
and Kymlicka, is more conservative in the sense that it does not fully acknowledge 
minority rights. 
 
Raz also presents a theory on liberal multiculturalism. Unlike Kymlicka, 
liberal multiculturalism that is offered by Raz does not recommend territorial 
separation.  On the contrary, all citizens share “same public places and common 
services.” 37  In Raz’s liberal multiculturalism, education of all cultural groups, 
toleration for cultural traditions and habits, equal redistribution and equal 
opportunity, public support for the establishment of cultural institutions, a shared 
public sphere for all cultural groups are essential components (Raz, 1992: 190).38  
Moreover, by offering a shared public sphere and a common culture among different 
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groups, Raz articulates that multiculturalists encourage change and interaction 
between different cultural group and states that “… liberal multiculturalism is not 
opposed in principle to the assimilation of one cultural group by others.”39 However, 
many multicultural demands show otherwise. In the case of Quebec, in order to 
prevent any kind of assimilation, exemption rights such as education language rights 
have passed. 40  Concisely, deep diversity that multicultural policies encompass, 
cannot always harmonize with liberal policies. Multicultural policies such as 
regional autonomy and customary law require new institutions and new 
establishment policies. However, the unity and harmony of the state can be inflicted 
because of these policies.  
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3.! THE IDEA OF NEUTRAL STATE (HAZALISTAN): RESOLUTION 
OF THE DILEMMA 
 
Although multicultural policies are defended for the compensation of 
disadvantages that minority groups encounter, in my opinion, multicultural policies 
lack the principle of equality by giving too much power to cultural groups. 
Accordingly, Anne Phillips states adoption of multiculturalism is contested by many 
feminists on the ground that multicultural policies also undermine the disadvantaged 
people such as children, poor, women and homosexuals by reinforcing and 
tolerating inequities of power.41 Moreover, the fact that “Culture is operating as a 
reason for public inaction and an excuse for immoral behavior”42 is another reason 
for the impermissibility of multiculturalism. Therefore, rather than adoption of 
multicultural policies, Hazalistan, a neutral state that respects minority groups, 
provides equal rights and protects its citizens regardless of their groups, will be 
presented. The emphasis of this imagined state is on diversity and equal citizenship, 
freedom and security, equal rights and liberal values since these issues are the most 
debated issues in the making of the modern state. The principle of providing equal 
rights for everyone requires giving enough space to minority groups to practice their 
cultures.  
 
Joseph Raz explains that the need to tolerate the minority cultures is 
supported by two arguments. The first argument relies on The Harm Principle 
claiming that as long as the actions of minority culture do not harm others, people 
are free to exercise their culture. The second argument refers to the social harmony 
and peace. In this respect, religious and cultural activities are allowed to maintain 
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equality in society.43 Although “toleration” is not the right emphasis, these two 
arguments are adopted for the reason that the harm principle ensures security of the 
citizens and, social harmony and peace are related with the equality principle. While 
the first argument is the prerequisite for the establishment of the state, the second 
argument is related to the persistence of the state. In order to maintain the harmony 
in social sphere, liberal states should find a balance controlling actions and 
responding cultural demands. In this respect, liberal state, first of all, should be 
neutral. Therefore, before defending my thesis based on harm principle and social 
harmony, a brief description of neutrality will be given. 
 
Neutrality is a delicate concept since there are different forms of neutrality. 
As Peter Jones distinguishes between three different views of neutrality or 
impartiality that liberals can adopt. The first view is about not supporting any 
particular culture and this view is similar to perspective of free market economy but 
in cultural terms. The second view is about not providing any particular advantage 
to any particular culture. And the third view is about opting out of any cultural 
debate by refraining to force any kind of good life. In this third view, neutral state 
recognizes all cultures equally.44  
 
The first view does not recognize any cultural community and does not 
appreciate human dignity in the liberal state structure. As Kukathas puts it, 
“Liberalism takes no interest in these interests or attachments-cultural, religious, 
ethnic, linguistic, or otherwise-that people might have.” 45  The second view is 
similar to Kymlicka’s view. Will Kymlicka states that “A distinctive feature of 
contemporary liberal theory is its emphasis on “neutrality” – the view that the state 
should not reward or penalize particular conceptions of the good life but, rather, 
should provide a neutral framework within which different and potentially 
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conflicting conceptions of the good can be pursued.”46 This neutrality does not turn 
a blind eye to people’s communal and social ties and it aims to eliminate any sort of 
social discrimination. Therefore, in this view, minorities may demand protection 
and receive special minority rights when they feel threatened. The third view, on the 
other hand, requires recognition for each culture, which entails that each culture has 
equal worth. Accordingly, Taylor emphasizes “A liberal society must remain neutral 
on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens 
deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all.”47  
 
Among these three views of neutrality, the first view is the only one that can 
be operationalized in Hazalistan. However, before defending the first view, other 
views should be clarified. The second view provides minority rights as privileges or 
special rights in the name of neutrality. In this view, minority groups can reach their 
way of good life through these special rights. However, such neutrality contradicts 
with the principle of equality. And, the third view provides equal cultural rights by 
recognizing all cultures. However, such policy would not work since all cultures 
cannot be valued equally. In short, in the case of other two views on neutrality, 
keeping the balance and regulating all cultures equally are harder since we do not 
live in perfect utopian states. On the other hand, the first view promotes equality of 
individuals without recognizing group identities, thus, is substantiated in Hazalistan. 
However, Kukathas’ view on neutrality is not completely satisfying since he states 
that human dignity and recognition are not the interests of liberalism that ensures 
equality before the law. First, Kukathas does not refer what the laws cover and his 
statement “Liberalism might well be described as the politics of indifference” does 
not explain how the constitution will be written without promoting the majority 
freedom and rights.48 Second, human dignity is not insignificant for liberalism. Even 
if liberalism does not assure the protection of cultural survival, liberalism should 
give equal importance and care to each individual. Kukathas’s non-solution for the 
non existing problem seems as a denial as a response to the existing problem. 
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Therefore, although the first view is adopted, human dignity is emphasized and 
although cultures are not recognized, all individual demands are taken into 
consideration in Hazalistan.  
 
The liberal neutral state, Hazalistan, endorses equality without endorsing 
and supporting any ways of good life.  More precisely, good life may differ among 
individuals and it is impossible to cover all the demands on the purpose of reaching 
good life. Therefore, the duty of the state is to provide basic needs such as security 
and freedom for its citizens to reach their way of good life. This requires diversity 
in civil society and protection of freedoms in the political sphere. Security and 
freedoms of the citizens are the priorities of the liberal state, since they constitute 
the basis of the state and society. Living together as a community requires some 
restrictions on cultural rights in accordance with the laws that maintain peace and 
order in the society. In this sense, collaboration between liberty, culture and rights 
is essential to maintain diversity.  
 
As stated in the previous chapters, culture is taken into consideration in 
compliance with the individual demands and should be evaluated within the 
perspective of liberal values. And, as long as there is no dispute on freedoms, 
individual rights are bestowed to individuals. In essence, cultural rights are 
considered as basic rights when they do not contradict with liberal values. The 
regulation of these basic rights also tackled in accordance with neutrality. However, 
these regulations should be examined further for the lucidity of the argument.  
 
3.1. Liberty and Harm Principle 
 
People do not live separately from each other in modern societies, thus, a 
common ground had to be found for their coexistence. Keeping the balance of 
liberty and harm principle is one of the recommended solutions for the establishment 
of the common ground. This common ground protects individuals from the group 
pressure and the notion of liberty enables groups to exercise their culture at the 
optimum extent. Since Mill is aware of the risk of social oppression and exploitation 
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of individuality and diversity, Mill gives a brief description of the precepts for the 
application of the harm principle, 
“The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for 
his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. 
Advice, instruction, persuasion and avoidance by other people if thought 
necessary by them for their own good are the only measures by which society 
can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of this conduct. 
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, 
the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or legal 
punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for 
its protection.”49 
 
In a similar vein, cultural practices are restricted with respect to the harm 
principle in the neutral liberal state. The justification of this statement become 
clearer when we think of the examples that cultural obligations and wellbeing of 
humans contradict. Female genital mutilation is one of the prominent examples of 
such contradiction. Accordingly, Peter Jones emphasizes that 
“cultures are not moral entities to which we can owe obligations of fairness. 
Insisting that we should be fair to cultures merely as cultures is like insisting 
that we should be fair to paintings or to languages or to musical 
compositions. These things may have value, but they do not have moral 
standing... So if we seek to deal fairly with cultural diversity it is not cultures 
that will be the ultimate objects of our concern but the people who bear 
them.”50 
 
As mentioned above, security/harm principle and freedom are the key factors 
of the establishment of the states. All social contract theorists aim to create a stable, 
secure environment for the citizens who are decided or forced to move out from the 
state of nature. To give an example, if you do not or cannot control your child, you 
cannot be conscious of his/her actions. On the other hand, over-monitoring and 
banning every action of the child may hamper his/her childhood development. Yet, 
giving space to your child while controlling his/her actions will give the child a 
chance to play his/her game without hurting himself or others. Hence, on what 
grounds should the actions be controlled and restricted?  
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When Hobbes said the greatest liberty of subjects rely on “the silence of the 
law”, he was referring to the state of nature and people’s independence from any 
sort of regulation.51 However, as Alford states by referring to Hobbes, “In Hobbes’ 
view, freedom in the state of nature is virtually meaningless, as there is no security 
in which to enjoy it.”52 As a consequence, liberty is valuable to individuals as long 
as there are protected liberties to take pleasure in. Moreover, in order to experience 
liberty without any fear, people have agreed to give up the greatest liberty and joined 
the social contract with the demands of security.  
 
Concisely, freedom is by nature bound to restrictions. By referring to Sartre, 
Fred Alford states that “Freedom would be meaningless because there would be 
nothing to be free from or to.”53 By way of illustration, without the rules of chess 
and the limits on the pieces, there would be no chess game to play. In addition to 
the rules of the game, there are other rules that were invented with the 
institutionalization of the chess games. For instance, touch-move-rule, which forces 
the player to play the piece that he/she touched is not a part of the original rules of 
the chess. But in tournaments, touch-move-rule is always applied to avoid 
distraction and confusion. In compliance with the chess example, it can be claimed 
that external constraints are necessary when institutionalization and socialization 
begins. Accordingly, different institutions such as tribes, sports federations and 
states have one thing in common: restrictions. And today, we are neither 
independent nor stateless. We have institutions that limit our actions and regulate 
the social and political sphere within legal limits. Therefore, our freedoms are 
defined and determined by constitutional rights and rules. To underlie the 
importance of the rights, Sandel asserts that “I am free insofar as I am the bearer of 
rights, where rights are trumps.” 54  Therefore, freedom and rights work in 
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conjunction and accordingly, all liberty demands cannot be accepted 
unconditionally. 
 
Berlin’s distinction between two concepts of liberty, i.e. positive and 
negative, can be useful to clarify the matter. Berlin introduces negative liberty as 
the actions that a person can perform without any interference. Thus, negative 
freedom is a reflection of being free from coercion or absence of constraints. Second 
concept of freedom, positive liberty is described as actions that a person can perform 
within the limits that are determined by a control mechanism.55 Berlin states that 
“The ‘positive’ sense of the word liberty derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master.”56 Through this self-mastery, people achieve their 
goals.  For Berlin, achieving the willed goals and realizing life are core parts of the 
positive liberty. Accordingly, on the one hand, the need for recognition and self-
realization are related with the positive liberty. On the other hand, coexistence and 
institutionalization entail negative liberty whose limits are set by the government. 
Although Berlin distinguishes these conceptions of liberty, I consider them as 
interrelated, in that I take negative liberty to be a prerequisite for the exercise of 
positive liberty. More precisely, negative liberty does not assure infinite liberty of 
the actions but describes the actions that can be exercised without interference. And 
for positive liberties, if self-realization requires an interaction, negative liberty 
draws the framework of “the interaction”.  
 
With regard to negative liberty, liberal states control and limit individual’s 
actions, but individuals’ thought and personal beliefs are not restricted. People are 
free to pursue their diverse ends within the limits of liberalism. In other words, 
multiculturalist demands, essentially positive liberties, are restricted by negative 
liberties which are substantiated by liberals.  If one needs to travel for self 
realization, liberal states does not restrict this practice. However, if one needs to 
sacrifice people for the sake of his self-realization, the state would not permit its 
practice. More precisely, the act of killing is restricted within the law, but the idea 
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of killing is not restricted as long as it is not shared or presented as a threat. In 
essence, the thought and beliefs are not the issues that liberal states can intervene 
in, only harmful actions can be restricted if they are posing a threat other people’s 
life, liberty and properties. As Barry states,  
“Any doctrine that gives the state the duty to prevent physical injury and 
death from being inflicted on its inhabitants will have the implication that 
the state should intervene. All that has to be said is that a liberal state such a 
state.”57 
 
From this point of the view, however, state intervention may also include coercion. 
Accordingly, Jeremy Waldron states that, by making reference to Kant, “Physical 
coercion is justified as a “negation of the negation” whenever it is used against an 
action that wrongfully hinders or interferes with someone else’s external 
freedom.”58 However, negation of the negation can only be justified when there is 
an expected and/or proven threat to physical wellbeing of the citizens. For instance, 
in order to prevent an assassin from harming other people, security forces may have 
to shoot the assassin.  By the same token, in the case of injustice, liberal state is 
obliged to ensure security by protecting the oppressed individuals. If a person is 
discriminated because of its culture, the person should be protected by the state. In 
other words, the neutral liberal state is a state that does not discriminate groups in 
favor of majority culture. Oppression, physical harm and discrimination are 
outlawed to protect each citizen in the country.  
 
In compliance with the peacekeeping mission, liberal state enables its citizens 
to exercise their freedoms to enter and exit the groups and emphasizes that people 
are only free when they have a choice to participate and to step back. Freedom that 
liberalism entails, aims facilitate optimum space for its citizens to act as they wish. 
Consequently, liberal state’s duty is not only limiting the freedoms but also 
providing security for its citizens’ life choices. In line with these arguments, liberal 
state maintains the social harmony through educating the citizens against prejudice 
and intolerance towards other people. This does not mean that cultures should be 
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tolerated by the liberal state. But toleration among individuals should be encouraged 
for the sake of social harmony.  
 
3.2. Social Harmony and Equal Citizenship 
 
Despite the fact that harm principle constitutes the core of the contract, the 
continuity of the state depends on the social harmony. Therefore, in a liberal society, 
these two notions are inalienable. Social harmony is established through 
socialization and communication of different groups.  Connected with the harmony 
principle, Adeno Addis emphasizes the importance of dialogue and communication 
between groups for mutual agreement, and he states that “What we need is to explore 
institutional structures and processes that would simultaneously allow us to affirm 
and respect plurality while also cultivating some notion of solidarity.”59 In other 
words, the duty of the state is fostering diversity with respect to harmony. And 
maintenance of the social harmony rests on the principle of equality. The principles 
of equal rights, equal freedom and equal value gather under the roof of equal 
citizenship and are provided for all individuals in the spirit of social harmony.  
 
Consequently, equal citizenship is one of the core ideas of neutral liberal 
state. Equal citizenship requires two main dimensions. The first dimension provides 
equal treatment before law. As Young emphasizes, “Whatever social or group 
differences among citizens, whatever their inequalities of wealth, status and power 
in the everyday activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status 
as peers in the political public.”60 Since equal citizenship is based on the assumption 
of equal dignity for all citizens, establishing equal rights is essential. So, the 
rejection of such cultural demands such as subordination of women or Hindu caste 
system, is justified by the social harmony principle, which endorses equality among 
the citizens.  
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The second dimension deals with equal opportunity to reach the social and 
political resources and provides equal participation in civil society. To be more 
precise,  
“Citizenship involves functioning not only as political agent – voting, 
engaging in political speech, petitioning government and so forth – but 
participating as an equal in civil society. This entails freedom of association, 
access to public spaces such as roads, parks, and public accommodations 
including public transportation, the postal service, and 
telecommunications.”61  
 
In this respect, the liberal state should maintain equality with respect to freedom and 
justice among its citizens. Multiculturalists may call for privileging cultural 
identities over other demands and they state that diversity is hindered since equal 
citizenship endorses standard cultural forms. Standardization of the rights, however, 
is essential on behalf of neutrality. And modern states are the results of social 
contracts and modern states stand for neutrality because of their promises such as 
equality and justice.  
 
Parekh summarizes the features of modern states as follows: “single source 
of authority”, “single set of constitutional principles”, “equal rights”, “homogenous 
relationship between individual and the state”, “united people”. However, one of the 
limitations of the modern state that seem problematic for Parekh is that all citizens 
of the modern state should privilege their citizenship identities over their cultural 
identities. Common political understanding should be established among citizens.62 
However, unlike Parekh suggests, liberal states’ aim is not to create culturally 
homogeneous society; rather, the neutral liberal state aims to create a homogeneous 
society in terms of equal rights and mutual understanding. If these principles hinder 
a group’s culture, then the neutral liberal state can be considered as assimilationist. 
However, this kind of assimilation does not seem problematic to me, since any 
individual from any group may one day need equal rights and sympathy.  
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Moreover, the neutral liberal state would not restrain the pursuit of cultural 
traditions when they do not pose a threat to life, liberties and social harmony. The 
neutral state does not recognize any cultural tradition because of the possible 
disagreement with liberal values, therefore, as Barry puts it, “…. liberalism cannot 
accommodate ‘deep diversity and that it is right not to do so.”63 When people beat 
women or rape children by reason of culture, the neutral liberal state cannot allow 
this tradition to persist. Or, when a cultural group demands a special treatment for 
their neighborhood, the neutral liberal state does not subsidize any special treatment. 
Considering such cases that cultural groups demand or act in opposition to liberal 
values, the question is that “Why do people want to live under a liberal state while 
their culture is constituted by illiberal rules and notions?” Individuals who think that 
state is necessary for the sake of their own future joined the contract by accepting 
the laws that protects the liberal notions. As Ayşe Kadıoğlu states “in the liberal 
individualist tradition, the conception of citizenship generates no social bond other 
than contract.” 64  The nature of the contract requires a compensation for the 
formation of coexistence. In this case, cultural groups would have to give up some 
cultural traditions and habits in exchange for security and freedom. People accept 
liberal values such as equal protection, equal freedom and neutrality, when they 
enter the contract. And these values are intended for providing equal rights and basic 
conditions to citizens. With the adoption of the liberal values, people can pursue and 
achieve “the good life” in their own ways.  
 
3.3. Rights 
 
Each culture embodies certain symbols and practices. Symbols show 
individuals’ belongingness to a group. By virtue of the social life, cultural symbols 
and practices become visible in the society. The contradiction here is that some 
symbols and practices are ostracized by other groups on the ground that some 
symbols and practices harass the other groups mentally and physically. In other 
words, they consider some symbols and practices as the limitation to their freedom.  
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This objection might be justified under some conditions such as violence and 
security issues or the restriction of freedoms.  
 
The reason on the emphasis on security and freedom is that they constitute 
the main elements of peaceful cohabitation. However, mental discomfort is not 
psychological violence or harm, therefore anything considered as visual pollution 
by other parties does not count as conflict of freedoms. Moreover, cultural practices 
that contradict the equality principle should not be allowed either. This equality 
principle operates on behalf of the harmony of the society. To put it briefly, as long 
as there is no violence or a practice/symbol that may trigger physical harm vis-à-vis 
other parties, and when there is no threat to equality in the society, cultural symbols 
and practices should not be banned.  
 
Liberty and harm principle, and social harmony are not vague conceptions 
in liberal thought. These concepts are structured around legal terms and binding 
through legally enforceable rights. Consistently, liberal emphasis on individuality 
and neutrality is also in connection with legal requirements. While the notion of 
individuality fosters individual rights, neutrality with reference to non recognition 
of cultural values, promotes temporary rights.  
 
 
3.3.1.! Individual vs Group Rights 
 
Liberalism seeks to safeguard individual rights rather than group rights. 
Since individuals are self owners, the citizens can make decisions for their own 
futures. With respect to this fact, slavery is abolished and individual freedoms are 
cherished in liberal societies and the self-ownership entails certain responsibilities 
and rights. These responsibilities and rights are entitled to individuals by virtue of 
liberal state. Despite the fact that the individual rights can turn into group rights in 
practice, the neutral liberal state does not recognize groups for the sake of individual 
rights and freedoms. However, multiculturalists object the liberal state’s emphasis 
on individuality and demand group rights to be recognized. Recognition of group 
rights is a controversial issue.  
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First of all, groups are not homogenized entities. Since each individual 
belong to diverse groups, complete uniformity within groups is not possible. Despite 
the heterogeneity of the groups, groups pretend to be homogenous entities. As Scott 
states, “Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to 
speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and 
autonomous.”65 In other words, multiculturalists blame liberals for being difference 
blind; however, they treat cultural groups as they are homogeneous. Gay imam 
example from France is quite influential to refute the multiculturalist argument for 
the recognition of group rights. Ludovic Mohamed Zahed is a gay imam who opened 
a gay-friendly mosque in Paris. Although Islam’s intolerance to gay marriage and 
its conservative traditions, Ludovic Mohamed Zahed shows that even Islam, which 
is labeled as illiberal, harbors different groups within.66 Therefore, labelling cultures 
by glossing over individuals and subgroups does not match with the notion of 
diversity.   
 
Accordingly, group is a disordered and entangled concept. Group rights 
should not be provided in the name of culture, but people should be free to gather, 
open institutions without opposing the law and exercise their culture as a group or 
as an individual. To give an example, if a group of people who love signing decide 
to establish a social club for musical gatherings, do we object this demand? By the 
same token, if a religious group want to institutionalize for being able to pray 
together, do we consider both demands as identical? In my opinion, both demands 
can be evaluated similarly and state should respond both demands by allowing 
institutionalization. However, in any case, state should not subsidize or support such 
formations with respect to its neutrality. To sum up, all rights are provided to 
individuals with respect to equal citizenship.  
 
########################################################
65 Joan W. Scott, “Multiculturalism and Politics of Identity,” The MIT Press 61 (1992): 
18.#
66 Takis Würger, “Suras and Tolerance: Meet Europe’s Gay Imam,” Der Spiegel, 
August 13, 2014, accessed July 10, 2016, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/gay-muslim-imam-brings-message-of-
tolerance-to-europe-a-985863.html. 
28#
#
Second, group right demands not only contradict liberals’ emphasis on 
individuality of liberalism but they also the unity of the society and the neutrality of 
the state. Therefore, cultural demands, which are contrary to liberal values such as 
self government or external rules, are not allowed. To illustrate, English commercial 
signs are not allowed in Quebec with the aim of preserving the Quebec culture.67 
However, exalting one culture over another in the name of culture protection cannot 
reconcile with the liberal neutrality. In a similar vein, another example concerns 
security; Sikh religious belief requires to carry a kris (a dirk) and according to their 
interpretation of freedom of religion, Sikhs should be able to carry this symbol 
theoretically. However, carrying offensive weapons is prohibited as a precaution for 
public safety in liberal states. The conflict of religious and liberal values leads to 
one crucial consequence: the loss of the continuity of one of these values.68 Because 
of the riskiness of the Sikh practice, liberal values are preserved with priority by 
virtue of neutral liberal state.  
 
Similarly, exemption right demands allowing minorities to act differently 
than the whole society and therefore, such rights pose a threat to freedom and safety 
of other members of the society and are rejected by the neutral liberal state. For 
instance, Sikhs demand to rescind the law for wearing helmet while driving 
motorcycle to be able to wear turban. However, wearing turban instead of helmet 
should not be allowed since it threatens the safety of the passenger. Nevertheless, 
other “exemptions” that does not pose a threat to security and freedoms are not 
considered as the basic rights in the first place. To give an example, being able to 
wear turban/headscarf in workplace or gay marriage should not be described as 
exemption rights. Because, these practices do not pose a physical threat to other 
members or do not disrupt the social harmony. Similarly, in the neutral liberal state, 
the minority rights regulations are not offered since the rights that should be 
provided for cultural groups are based on legal egalitarianism in an ideal liberal 
society. In brief, without violating the principles of security and freedom, people are 
able to enjoy their culture and exercise it freely. And, external and exemption rules 
########################################################
67 Jacob T. Levy “Classifying Cultural Rights,” in Ethnicity and Group Rights ed. Ian 
Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York/London: New York University Press, 1997), 34.#
68 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 152. 
29#
#
that put constraints on the liberty and security of other citizens are not permitted in 
the liberal neutral state. As Patten states,  
“One does not need fancy normative theories of cultural justice to see why 
constitutions should often extend minority rights to cultural groups. Instead, 
all needed is a morally minimal concern to prevent oppression and fear, 
combined with the observation that the point of constitutions is, in part, to 
counterbalance prospective threats to liberty, security, and other basic 
interests.”69 
 
3.3.2.! Temporary vs Permanent Rights 
 
Multiculturalist demands may be twofold for the protection of the culture. 
First, their demand may constitute transmission of the culture to the next 
generations. Second, they may demand protection only for themselves. These two 
demands differ in that, while the former demand requires a permanent rule and 
recognition in the constitution, the latter demand can be provided temporarily. At 
this juncture, the question is “Where should the line between liberal principles and 
multiculturalist demands be drawn?”  
 
The difference between temporary and permanent rights is that the latter 
justifies that there will be no change in demands, identities and expectations. 
Whereas the former one is open to change, braces differences and allows next 
generations to choose other options. Therefore, implying temporary rights is more 
reasonable and beneficial. As Tarıq Modood indicates that, “A culture is made 
through change.”70 Among the people who are gathered under the same roof of 
culture, practices, value systems, meaning networks and norms differ because of 
identity, age and gender variances. Moreover, social setting, different historical 
backgrounds and time leads to variances within the same culture. This variation and 
diversity tend to give rise to subgroups. Different schools and different practices 
within religions are the examples of this change.  For instance, as far as I have 
observed, the implementations of Islam vary in different cities of Turkey. Although, 
Adana and Antakya are not distant cities, Islamic implementations in Adana are not 
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identical with the implications in Antakya. To illustrate, while in Antakya, Muslims 
visit the decedent’s grave for seven days after the funeral, this practice does not exist 
in Adana.71  
 
Accordingly, Michel Seymour argues that although culture is constituted by 
“a shared public language, shared public institutions and a shared public history”, 
people’s perception on their culture or how they implement practices can change 
over time.72 Since change is always a possibility and, the same cultural rights may 
not be demanded by new generations, such rights are not permanently recognized 
in the neutral liberal state. In any case, the recognition rights, as we saw, is not 
necessary for the continuity of cultures. The headscarf issue in Turkey was an 
example of the malfunction of the permanent rights. In 1989, Constitutional Court 
decided that wearing headscarf in Universities should be banned on the ground that 
laws cannot be based on religious bases.73 According to Turkish law, this decision 
is permanent and legally binding and new amendments cannot contradict the 
constitution as it states in the 11th article of the Turkish constitution. Therefore, the 
amendments in favor of women, who wear türban, cannot have a legal basis because 
of the permanency of the laws.74 In short, the decision of Turkish Constitutional 
Court blocks the future amendments that can appear as a result of a change.75  
 
Temporary rights can be provided for the fulfillment of the needs of the 
citizens. However, providing temporary rights does not signify that liberal state 
recognizes the cultural groups. On the contrary, the neutral liberal state does not 
recognize cultural groups, but, it respects individual’s choices. In this sense, 
individual rights can be bestowed for the sake of individual freedoms. As Habermas 
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stresses with reference to temporary right regulations, “The reproduction of 
traditions and cultural forms is an achievement which can be legally enabled, but by 
no means granted.”76  
 
In line with the Habermas’ argument, Loobuyck advocates the 
implementation of multicultural measures without minority rights. And by referring 
to multicultural measures, he states that “they serve to increase social integration 
and eliminate unfair inequalities, and are therefore, at least in principle, 
temporary.”77 However, Loobuyck’s multicultural measures do not match with my 
version of temporary rights. In Loobuyck’s view, a child can be absent from school 
for a religious holy day. However, in my opinion, such exemption rights should not 
be granted. The temporary rights that are defended in this thesis, include being able 
to wear turban at work, being able to perform the salaat in public or gathering for 
gay pride. These exemptions are not real exemptions; indeed, they are individual 
rights that were formerly banned by states. However, although they have been 
provided as individual rights, the neutral liberal state does not grant the permanence 
of the rights. These rights are bound to need and demand of the citizens. As I 
explained in the previous chapters, the neutral liberal state has no duty of protection 
of a culture or group since cultures do not have intrinsic values. By giving temporary 
rights, what is protected is not cultures but the ability of individuals to pursue their 
own ends.  
 
Temporary recognition of cultural rights can also play a significant role for 
the compensation of past injustices committed against cultural groups. Although 
group rights are not recognized in the neutral liberal state, group rights can be 
bestowed as a compensation for the past injustices, which may take the form of 
crimes against humanity. The reason for the temporariness of these rights is that 
people who were worse off at the times of injustice can made be better off in time 
and this makes the affirmative action unnecessary. For instance, blacks benefited 
from special rights in USA as a compensation for racial discrimination. But, do they 
still special rights even after having a black president? In this matter, Kukathas asks 
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that if my ancestors have committed to injustice against someone, should I or my 
children be held responsible for the past injustice? His answer is no.78  
 
Kukathas believes that in the same manner, state should not be held 
responsible for past injustices since holding the state responsible means also holding 
citizens responsible regarding past injustices.79 What Kukathas misses that under 
some circumstances such as crimes against humanity, providing group rights is a 
matter of justice. Although Kukathas’ position is quite strict, my position on this 
matter is more moderate. In my opinion, temporary rights should be provided for a 
brief time when groups are disadvantaged in current society because of past 
injustices such as slavery or genocide. In this respect, the state impartiality is the 
key for the resolution of the right claim debates. While trying to bring justice for the 
crimes against humanity, states should act like a judge, whose duty is the protection 
of the rights of the injured parties. In other words, states should adopt the courtroom 
policy since state as an institution corresponds to impartiality.  
 
Contrary to Kukathas’ opinion, Kymlicka argues that, “State neutrality 
ensures that the culturally subordinate group has as many options as possible 
concerning that interaction, and that the costs of that imbalance for the subordinate 
groups are minimized.”80 In this matter, Kymlicka’s view seems more plausible. 
However, it should be noted that Kymlicka’s view on the state neutrality is adopted 
in the extent of compensation for past injustices and in the scope of temporary rights 
in the neutral liberal state, Hazalistan. Even though it may not be impossible to fully 
erase the memories of injustices, showing good will is the duty of the neutral liberal 
state. To sum up, providing some temporary rights as a compensation for the crimes 
against humanity is not partiality.  Rather, reaching a verdict on the side of the 
injured party is justice and it is the duty of the neutral liberal state. 
 
4.! AN ILLUSTRATION: THE CASE OF RELIGION 
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After discussing the theoretical framework of multiculturalism-liberalism 
debate, this chapter focuses on religion, which is one of the main elements of culture. 
As Parekh states, “No religion can be culture-free and the divine will cannot acquire 
a determinate human meaning without cultural mediation.”81 In order to elucidate 
the matter, specific examples will be examined.  
 
Where the boundaries of freedom of conscience is a long lasting debate in 
political sphere. Its roots can be traced to Protestant Reformation, which occurred 
in 1517 in Germany. And with the establishment of the modern state, religious 
institutions withdrew from the political affairs in public sphere. As Habermas argues 
“The principle of separation of state and church obliges politicians and officials 
within political institutions to formulate and justify laws, court rulings, decrees and 
measures only in a language which is equally accessible to all citizens.” 82 
Consequently, today, when we consider the place of religion in liberal societies, 
freedom of conscience is provided as a substantive right. The actions stemming from 
their belief, however, is restricted according to laws that protect other people’s 
freedom and rights as well.  
 
To be more precise, 9th Article of European Convention on Human Rights 
can be presented for the interpretation of the limits of the freedom of religion. The 
Article states that; 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”83 
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Within the context of the 9th Article of European Convention on Human Rights, the 
aim is not protecting any norms of culture or religion but to ensure the freedom of 
expression of individuals to greatest possible extent. Consistently, liberal states 
abstain from supporting any specific religious faith or institution but attach 
importance to individual identities and diversities for the sake of nature of 
liberalism. However, this exposition examined and detailed further. 
 
Seymour asks the following questions concerning the duty of state towards 
religious groups, “Should the liberal state allow for special hours reserved only for 
Muslim women in public swimming pools? Should we satisfy the request made by 
male citizens who, in order to obtain their driver’s license, want to pass their driving 
test with a male civil servant?”84 The answer is no, liberal state has no obligation to 
meet such needs. Besides, even in the case of religion, a person may belong more 
than one religion in his/her heart. Pi, the narrator of the book, “Life of Pi”, is the 
fictional character who is Hindu, Muslim and Christian at the same time. Although, 
Pi is a fictional character, the example serves to make sense of real examples. 
Therefore, if state would give privileges to groups, would Pi benefit from all special 
rights that are granted to Hindu, Muslim and Christian groups? Who would have the 
right to tell him to decide on one religion? Since these questions are beyond the 
scope of liberal state, liberal state neither asks Pi’s religion, nor gives special rights 
to enjoy. The duty of the liberal state begins with securing the life of the citizens 
and ends with equality for the sake of harmony. In line with these principles, in this 
chapter, different cases will be presented in order to clarify the matter.  
 
First of all, any practice or symbol that creates isolation and separation in 
public sphere should not be allowed since states are collective entities. As I 
mentioned earlier, as well as culture, being a part of social relations is an important 
factor in identity formation. Therefore, discrimination should be prohibited and 
religious rights should be granted within particular limits so as to allow free social 
interaction. For instance, if a Muslim man demands not to see any women without 
headscarf in Muslim quarter –assuming the Muslim quarter is formed without any 
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state regulation-, the state should not recognize this claim. Another related issue is 
unequal positions of sexes in religions. Since marriage and divorce are the interests 
of the liberal state, the liberal state should intervene in these family issues in order 
to maintain equality between men and women. For instance, Muslim and Orthodox 
Jewish divorce law allow men to divorce without giving any notice to women and 
these men are able to remarry by disregarding their old family. 85  Since such 
practices are against the principle of equality and they distort the social harmony, 
liberal state does not allow such practices.  
 
Related with the inequality, Galston gives another example of unresolved 
court case between Ohio Civil Rights Commission and Dayton Christian Schools, 
Inc. Christian fundamentalist school did not make a new contract with a teacher by 
reason of her pregnancy and their religious belief that does not allow mothers with 
young children to work outside their homes. Based upon teacher’s objection, Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission investigated the issue and presumed that school 
discriminated a worker depending on religious reasons, and offered an agreement 
together with full reinstatement and back pay.86 In my opinion, this case is quite 
controversial. A liberal state, in that case should protect the rights of teacher. Since 
religious reasons applied discrimination, the teacher has a right to demand 
compensation for her unemployment. Forcing the school to rehire the teacher seems 
as an inaccurate decision because even if the school renews the contract of the 
teacher, in my opinion, the tranquility for both parties in the school cannot be 
maintained.  
 
Liberal values protect each citizen’s freedom equally and we should bear in 
mind that these values are the providers of the freedom of religion in the first place. 
A reality that has been recognized is that, as Barry highlights “Nobody, anywhere 
in the world, should be denied liberal protections against injustice and 
oppression.”87 Therefore, liberal values constitute the basic rights for everyone. To 
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give an example, some people evaluate that headscarf limits the freedom of women 
and is demonstrated as a political symbol, therefore it should be banned. However, 
as in the case of Turkey, women who wear headscarves argue that headscarf by 
protecting the women liberates them and assists them to join social and political 
life.88 Being a believer and practicing the belief individually does not make the 
individuals illiberal. Moreover, any piece of cloth that we are wearing, restricts our 
freedoms. A skirt or a t-shirt is also the production of a particular culture. Therefore, 
attaining a special status for headscarf among other clothes does not seem 
reasonable. Banning political symbols in workplace or in public realm does not 
remove the potential hazards on injustice and inequalities. 
 
Second, security is the pillar of the liberal state. In this respect, religious 
people and/or believers should be able to wear symbols that do not contradict with 
the security laws. For instance, British Parliament, in 1971, passed a law that forces 
motorcyclists and passengers to wear helmets without exemption. However, this 
decision was challenged by Sikhs, who wants to wear turban instead of helmet as 
required by their religion on the ground that this law contradicts with freedom of 
religion as expressed in European Convention of Human Rights.89  Despite the 
controversies, the law was amended in 1976 in Britain, and Sikh turban “was 
accepted as an adequate substitute for the helmet.”90 Relatedly, Sikhs faces with 
difficulties to find a job in construction market since turban cannot be worn in 
construction sites instead of helmets. Moreover, working in construction is 
especially crucial for Sikhs by reason of their traditional occupation of artisanship. 
However, the Sikh demand contradicts with the directive from the Council of the 
European Communities of 1989 that obliges workers to wear helmets in 
construction areas and evidently increases the risk of physical injury.91 Another 
example is that Sikhs’ demand to carry a small dagger as a compulsory requirement 
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of their religion. And Sikhs argue that prohibiting this exercise contradicts with 
freedom of religion.92 Contrary to Britain experience, in my opinion, carrying a 
knife or wearing turban instead of helmet should not be allowed for Sikhs even they 
are considered as religious symbols and a part of their practice.  
 
Protection of the health of the citizens can also be analyzed under the issue 
of security. Hindu practice of cremation and then scattering the ashes of the dead 
over a river is banned in western societies on “aesthetic and hygienic grounds”.93 
However, as I mentioned above, mental discomfort or aesthetic factors should not 
be considered as “harm”. Moreover, the assumption on hygiene is not plausible 
since scattering of the ashes does not put people’s health into a risk. Therefore, as 
Parekh also argues “…the practice should be allowed in closed and officially 
designated places...” 94  On the same account, another example is that female 
circumcision is a tradition and its roots can be traced to Ancient Rome.  This 
tradition causes physical harm and endanger the life of the girls and decimate the 
origin of the pleasure.95 Therefore, this practice should be banned in liberal societies 
although it destroys the millennial tradition.  
 
Children rights should also be protected by the state. Child marriage or child 
abuse is another issue that should be considered since some culture demands it as a 
cultural right. As Barry states, “in the case of Muslim personal law, it would also 
permit a parent or guardian to marry off a minor child without the consent of the 
child (Barry, 2001: 319).” 96  Considering such cases, providing recognition to 
cultures is not possible. In this case, as well liberal state has right to protect 
children’s rights in defiance of religion and family demands.  
 
Another closely related issue concerning children rights is education. Amish 
people does not want mandatory educational requirements and timetables on the 
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ground that formal schooling dilutes the control of the families over their children 
and make the children exempt from seasonal farm work and religious ceremonies.97 
However, such demand ignores the responsibility of the state towards children and 
society. As Barry states, there are two reasons of state involvement in education. 
First, “… citizens are concerned with the future of their society” and “The state is 
conceived of here as a guardian of children’s interests, if necessary in opposition to 
the parents’ view of those interests.”98 Second, public private distinction allows 
states to intervene in children education since state is obliged to provide equal 
amount of education for each children.99 Education is an important component of 
liberalism since education also provides moral elements such as respecting other 
cultures and transmits scientific discoveries such as evolution theory. And 
correspondingly, schools should not provide any kind of religious education for the 
sake of state neutrality. Parekh argues that limiting religious education in schools 
affect the children adversely since religion like art and literature is a part of social 
life. 100  First of all, giving information about religion as a part of history and 
humankind should not be forbidden. However, religious education for children, in 
my opinion, is not necessary for their development. The research that had been 
conducted by Jean Decety, Jason M. Cowell, Kang Lee, Randa Mahasneh, Susan 
Malcolm-Smith, Bilge Selcuk and Xinyue Zhou also shows that religious education 
does not intensify the altruism at young age. Moreover, they declare that “Our 
findings robustly demonstrate that children from households identifying as either of 
the two major world religions (Christianity and Islam) were less altruistic than 
children from non-religious households.”101 Second, liberal state neither restricts 
private religious courses, nor supports these courses in line with state neutrality. 
Accordingly, religious people should be able to form institutions in order to meet 
with other members of the group and to pray. As long as they follow the state 
regulations, they should be able to open courses to teach their religion and traditions. 
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Because, these activities do not pose a physical harm within and without the group 
and distract the social harmony.  
 
Third, the duality of the rights creates a controversy. With reference to this 
controversy, Western style of polygamy and religious polygamy can be 
demonstrated as an example. Polygamy is often considered as a “violating principle 
of equality between men and women.”102 However, in my opinion, this is only true 
when having more than one partner is attained to only one gender. To be more 
precise, although polygamy that is demanded by Muslims is outlawed, Western style 
of polygamy which is being able to have more than one partner is not outlawed. As 
Modood also mentions, in fact, urban Muslims are strict monogamists while 
contemporary Western societies recognize and engage in informal polygamy as a 
feature of the modernity.103  The difference is polygamy in Islam discriminates 
women and it only allows men to have more than one partner, whereas in Western 
culture, polygamy or “open relationships” is an open option for both sexes. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, liberal state stands against the 
institutionalization of both types of polygamy as long as inequalities persist between 
sexes. As Parekh also argues, if the economic, social status of women is equalized 
with men, if the self-esteem of the women reaches the equal level with men and if 
the inequalities can be abolished between sexes for good, liberal state can allow 
institutionalization of polygamy.104 However, until then, liberal state should allow 
only monogamous marriages.  
 
In addition to the discussion on the position of the religion in liberalism, it 
should be noted that Christianity is not favored in the discussion. As Parekh 
indicates, the role of Christianity cannot be denied in the formation of liberalism.105 
However, although the examples that I have mentioned are mostly from non-
christian groups, it does not imply that Christian belief is the core of liberalism. 
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Many Christian values contradict with the liberal principles such as equality. For 
instance, in Germany, Evangelic churches do not marry off gay couples. However, 
I should admit that some practices in liberal societies satisfy the needs of Christians 
such as having Sunday off. As Parekh also exemplifies “This puts Muslims at a 
disadvantage who, unlike Christians, cannot join communal prayer on Friday, their 
holy day.”106 In my opinion, the reason of the “inequality” does not stem from the 
nature of the liberalism but it is related to circumstances of advanced capitalism. 
While, financially strong countries such as Qatar are able to choose Friday as their 
holiday, other countries with high Muslim population such as Turkey cannot 
maintain such a system with weak financial standards and institutions. Therefore, 
such inequalities do not stem from the privileges that liberalism grants and these 
inequalities can be easily overcome through random selection. In short, since 
liberalism by definition does not recognize, promote or support any kind of religion 
or culture, there is no room to claim that liberalism is Western or Christianity 
oriented.  
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5.! A MINIMAL STATE WITH A MINIMAL CONSTITUTION 
 
Individuality is central for liberal theory because individuals are the origins 
of the social contracts and state theories. However, multiculturalists such as 
Margalit and Halbertal object the centralization of individuals in liberal culture by 
stating that “… the individual cannot have the capacity to be a bearer of the right to 
culture, since the interest of one person cannot constitute a sufficient reason for 
placing others under the obligation to help him or her maintain his or her 
culture...”107 However, multiple objections can be raised for this statement. First, 
Margalit and Halbertal’s group rights definition would not work in a small state or 
province since there might be individuals who does not belong to any specific group. 
Second, this definition hinders the groups that can be created and influenced by 
prominent figures such as Martin Luther, Che Guavera or Jefree Star. And lastly, if 
the number determines what is worth to protect and what is not, the claim that 
majority culture should be the judge contradict with multiculturalist claims. Besides, 
if the group is the core of multiculturalist claims, groups sizes among minority 
cultures should be featured in this discussion. If there is a difference between large 
minority culture and mini minority cultures, mini minority cultures should also be 
protected against the domination of large minority cultures. Afterwards, mini 
minorities should also be controlled for the safety of individual freedoms. However, 
in my opinion, the strength of the culture cannot be measured through numbers but 
through the strength of the affiliation of its members, even the number of the 
members is equal to one. 
 
Therefore, how a minimal state would work with a minimal constitution will 
be demonstrated. A good theory should work when the amount of the components 
is decreased or increased evenly. Since, modern states have large amount of 
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inhabitants, giving example of a small state can be useful to test the theory. Let’s 
assume 1000 people living together. And this village should have approximately 
250 households. And let’s assume some households belong to an “illiberal culture” 
and demand exemption/self government or special treatment rights. Regarding the 
numbers, some of the cultural right demands will be individualized. Under these 
circumstances, while households are divided into groups and refraining from each 
other, how could citizens remain united as a state as multiculturalists demand? In 
my opinion, such cohabitation is not feasible and preservation of diversity is only 
possible with the preservation of liberal values and unity of the state.  
 
To defend my position, a state, which aggrandizes liberal values with respect 
to diversity Mauritius, will be presented. Mauritius is chosen as an example of the 
functioning European liberalism although the state is not in Europe because of two 
reasons. First, Mauritius is adopted European liberal values when it was a colony 
and second, it is very successful to merge liberal values with its multicultural 
structure unlike European countries. Therefore, in my opinion, Mauritius can be a 
good example to demonstrate how to rule a multicultural society with the adoption 
of liberal values.  
 
Mauritius is a small island state, which was formerly a colony of 
Netherlands, France and Britain in the Indian Ocean. In 1968, Mauritians gained 
independence and in 1992, the island became a Republic. Mauritius is described as 
rainbow and a fruit salad because of the hospitality in the country towards diversity. 
The main sources of this diversity are the groups of “Hindus, Tamils, Telugus, 
Marathis, Muslims, Creoles and Chinese”.108 And these groups share their traditions 
with the members of other cultural groups and they also regenerate their cultural 
practices through socialization and cohabitation. For instance, “The sega, which is 
a typical Mauritian dance, popularly viewed as originating from slavery, actually 
has as its main instrument the “ravanne,” which is of Tamil origin, the “triangle,” 
which is originally French, and the “maravanne” likely of African origin.” 109 
########################################################
108 Caroline Ng Tseung-Wong and Maykel Verkuyten, “Multiculturalism, Mauritian 
Style: Cultural Diversity, Belonging, and a Secular State,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 59, no.6 (2015): 680-681. 
109 Ibid., 683.#
43#
#
Although Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten consider Mauritius as an example of 
survival of multiculturalism along with the Canada example, in my opinion, 
Mauritius case is incompatible with Canada example and also with multiculturalist 
demands. Mauritius is, indeed, a depiction of the neutral liberal state as described in 
the chapter of Hazalistan. Mauritians do not have group based constitutional 
policies, they promote diversity with respect to liberal values and individual rights 
and they prioritize the unity and harmony of the state.  
 
Although Mauritius does not provide constitutional foundation for 
multicultural policies, multiculturalism is well-functioning in the island. Since 
defenders of multiculturalism demand a constitutional base for their rights, 
Mauritius style multiculturalism does not match with their demands. Instead of 
legislating cultural rights, Mauritians embrace the tradition of “Lakorite,” which 
means being in harmony with other people, as the cement of the society.110 Lakorite 
tradition allows citizens to get along with each other with respect and enables them 
to share a common ground.  
 
Equality is privileged vis-à-vis multicultural demands in Mauritius. 
Considering Mauritius as a rainbow or fruit salad country, multiculturalism can 
function with respect to liberal values such as equality. To illustrate, in 1970s, 
Mauritius government initiated free schooling, for which the cooperation of 
Catholic schools was needed since their numbers exceed the number of the state 
schools. Catholic schools agreed to be transformed into government-subsidized 
schools. In return for their cooperation, Catholic schools demanded half of the seats 
which are reserved for Catholic students. However; a Hindu, Mr. Tengur, objected 
this bargain between Catholic schools and the government since this arrangement 
undermines the rights of the 11-year-old daughter. The Supreme Court recognized 
the objection and decided in favor of Mr. Tengur in 2002.111  
 
Although Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten’s approach is in favor of 
recognition, the recognition that they are offering does not have a group based 
########################################################
110 Ibid., 683. 
111 Ibid., 689-690. 
44#
#
policy. Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten’s recognition is more related with the idea of 
respecting the individual rights and beliefs. Without promoting special group rights 
and without discriminating minorities, neutral state tries to find a balance. As 
Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten state, in Mauritius, even religious matters can be 
unraveled through the alliance between state recognition of religious communities 
and state neutrality towards religious traditions. And this alliance is guaranteed by 
the judicial authority of the country through individual rights.112 Since individual 
rights are the protector of the diversity, liberal values considered superior over 
cultural demands. Therefore, group rights and special treatments do not find a place 
in legal structure. 
 
Without implementing special rights and providing privileges, Mauritius try 
to create equality and tranquility. As mentioned by Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten, 
creating a balance between cultural differences and remaining neutral is the duty of 
a state and accordingly, they state that “Having the sense that the state recognizes 
and values cultural and religious group differences, but yet equally emphasizing that 
group recognition does not become group discrimination in the eyes of the law, are 
key ingredients to a working multiculturalism.”113 Mauritian ideology reconciles the 
notions of cultural diversity and civic unity without presupposing or implementing 
cultural homogeneity. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen also emphasizes, “Both 
similarities and differences exist and are acknowledged. In Mauritian society, there 
are no myths of shared origins encompassing the entire population; and ethnic 
distinctiveness will continue to be reproduced in the foreseeable future.”114 In other 
words, beauty or utility of the state of Mauritius stems from the cultural mosaic. The 
cement of the stones that construct the mosaic is mutual understanding and respect. 
And lastly, the base and the frame of the mosaic are formed by liberal values. 
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6.! CONCLUSION 
 
Cultural elements and practices are not valued in liberal states in and of 
themselves since they do not have intrinsic values unlike individuals. Human 
individuals are the only concern of the liberal state. And individual demands on 
cultural rights can only be accommodated as long as they do not contradict with 
liberal values such as equality, security, freedom and social harmony. The reason 
behind this emphasis is that liberal values are the protector of the individual rights 
and liberties. Since there is no compulsion to participate to the social contract and 
since liberal values are accepted as a whole, protection of liberal values should not 
be violated in the name of cultural right. Multiculturalists such as Taylor who 
support and legitimize political recognition without considering drawbacks of 
multiculturalism may object this liberal statement. However, as Barry states “… 
multiculturalism poses as many problems as it solves.” 115  Therefore, adopting 
multiculturalist policies to deal with the citizens’ demands is more conflict-ridden 
than is admitted by multiculturalists. Instead, as proposed above, adopting neutral 
liberal policies is more beneficial for the society as a whole. This thesis does not 
argue that the system that was offered does not have any loopholes or disadvantages. 
The commitment to liberal values can also be contested by demonstrating the wars 
that liberal states took part. Accordingly, it is certain that even violence is justified 
when the reason is sex or war. Although, the liberal state system is not perfect, there 
is no political reality that everyone can accept, there are certainly multiple realities 
each group can employ. 
 
My theory aims to provide protection and freedom for everyone pre-
eminently. Some multiculturalist may dislike this position and find it hypocritical. 
However, the nature of the contract requires some kind of loss for both parties. And 
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in this liberal system, while multiculturalists have to give up some cultural practices 
for the sake of liberal values and social harmony, liberals have to live with other 
cultures for the sake of diversity. Moreover, as Galston states “… liberalism is about 
the protection of diversity, not the valorization of choice.”116 Therefore, giving 
privilege and value to any particular culture is not included in the mission of the 
liberal state. Therefore, neutrality policy of the liberal state by not recognizing 
cultural groups does not discriminate any culture at all. Hazalistan is a liberal state 
that encourages diversity within the limits of equality and security. Although 
cultures are not valued and not privileged, individuals are valued and the basic needs 
of the individuals are contemplated equally. In a word with full of wars and 
hypocrisy, in my opinion, Hazalistan offers an environment that can be lived in 
peacefully.  
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